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Since man does participate as a determinant in our own future, it is not valid to say, as many neurotics do, “Since everything is determined, there is nothing that I can do.” To say this is to deny the inner determinants of behavior, on the grounds that all things are determined, which is contradictory. Thus, while determinism is often used as an excuse for doing nothing, determinism actually provides the basis for the power of the individual to influence his own future. The fundamental goal of therapy is to help a client realize that although his past behavior was determined, his knowledge of those determinants and his knowledge of the ineffective, self-defeating nature of his present behavior are also determinants which give the patient the power to change. The actual creation of this understanding in a client is a practical matter that may be achieved in many ways, each of which may require specific prerequisites. Since it takes work to change habits, and neurotic behavior has adaptive aspects, particularly in manipulating other people, the client may not want to change even when he realizes that it is possible. This implicit decision can also be pointed out, and the reasons for it can be discussed and often modified.
The fundamental thesis of this paper is that the freedom to act and change in purposeful ways is real, and is based on deterministic knowledge. The most gratifying confirmation of this thesis is the widespread finding that simply stating it to a person in unequivocal terms often results in significant therapeutic progress. Drug addicts have a notoriously poor prognosis, yet Synanon (Yablonsky, 1965) has had considerable success through a massive direct application of this thesis. Each member is vividly and continually reminded that addictive behavior is stupid and self-destructive. Older members concretely demonstrate that change is possible and desirable, the Synanon “games” effectively prevent evasion of these truths, and they help members to change in specific ways. Chronic psychotics also have a very bad prognosis, yet Glasser (1965) gives a vivid and convincing account of the transformation of a chronic ward after it was simply made clear to the patients that they were capable of responsible, self-directed behavior and that irresponsible and manipulative behavior would not be tolerated.
The manipulative and evasive nature of neurotic behavior has long been recognized, as well as the therapeutic consequence of refusing to be manipulated (provided the patient cannot or will not escape this confrontation). Studies like Glasser's and many others, particularly those of the Mental Research Institute (Haley, 1963; Watzlawick, 1964) emphasize the adaptiveness of the strategy of being psychotic and irresponsible. Despite its obvious disadvantages, being “crazy” is sensible when a person is trapped in a situation in which rational behavior is punished, but crazy behavior is excused. The problem is not to try to change the patient's blood chemistry or probe into his past, but simply to convey to him that the rules have changed, and that the new rules are better and well worth the difficulties of learning them.
Another confirmation is the finding (Gatch and Termerlin, 1965) that Existential Therapists and Freudian Analysts behave similarly despite their apparently opposing theoretical views of freedom. Both consider the past to be fully determined, and both assert to the patient that he is free to choose in the future. That this kind of freedom is based on knowledge of determinants was shown by a study (Rogers, Kell and McNeil, 1948) which found that the degree of realistic understanding of themselves and their environment possessed by delinquents was by far the best predictor of later healthy adjustment, despite other contraindications. This thesis has long been explicit in Rogers' orientation and implicit in his technique, which emphatically states that the individual is free to decide and choose. “We have established by external control, conditions which we predict will be followed by internal control by the individual, in pursuit of internally chosen goals (1961, p. 397).”
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