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It is clear from even a brief review of current writing on the subject that the problem of reconciling freedom with determinism is not yet settled. Some writers (Skinner, 1953) explicitly deny any possibility of freedom, while others (Immergluck, 1964; Rogers, 1965) refuse to give up the idea of freedom, but are unable to reconcile it with determinism. The wide divergence of views is highlighted by a symposium (Hook, 1961) or a careful analysis of different arguments (Ofstad, 1961).
The major focus of this paper is upon the phenomenon of self-reference, which occurs in the paradoxes of self-reference, as well as in ordinary statements such as this sentence. The sentence above contains two self-references and both are meaningful: a statement about the paper of which the sentence itself is a part, and a statement in the sentence pointing out the existence of the self-reference in the sentence.
All knowledge and rational discussion is based ultimately upon self-referring epistemological justifications and upon the assumption of some degree of determinism. It is therefore necessary to examine the limitations of our tools of knowledge and analysis, and particularly the implications of the self-referring mathematical theorems of Godel, Tarski, Turing, and Church. I will show that the hypothesis of determinism is a useful superstition, and that hypotheses of indeterminism are empty of meaning, and cannot provide a basis for human freedom in any sense of the word.
Self-reference is embodied in every purposive living system which uses information about itself and its surroundings in ways that maintain and enhance the living system. A living organism's self-maintaining activities enable it to participate significantly in the determination of its own future state. Freedom is defined here as the ability of an organism to actualize the goals and purposes determined by, and inherent in, its structure. An organism is free to the extent that the consequences of its self-referring functioning result in the satisfaction of needs and goals. Human freedom is a consequence of man's capacity to influence his own future in his favor, which is dependent upon the deterministic lawfulness of both his own functioning and his surroundings. I will show that this definition of freedom can encompass all experiences to which a person might apply the term “free” or “freedom.”
The continuing controversy over this problem indicates that it is not a simple one; furthermore, I may use words imprecisely, and I hope the reader will heed Warren McCulloch's plea: “Don't bite my finger, look where I am pointing.”
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