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All indeterministic hypotheses have in common the assertion that events exist which have deterministic effects but which do not have sufficient causes to explain these effects. A statement that nothing is presently known about a set of events does not preclude the subsequent development of deterministic hypotheses which may serve to describe them. But an hypothesis of indeterminism for the same set of events is a statement that, in principle, nothing can be known about them. An indeterministic hypothesis is both empty and useless since it tells us nothing, it cannot be corroborated, and it may prevent scientists from creating alternative deterministic hypotheses which might prove to be fruitful.
One kind of indeterministic hypothesis is the assertion that there exists an unknowable transempirical agent which acts as a cause but is itself uncaused and which manifests itself irregularly. It is therefore inaccessible to lawful description and also inaccessible to refutation. Hypotheses of this kind include many religious and mystic assertions, which have had to steadily yield ground as useful deterministic hypotheses are advanced which explain and describe parts of their domain.
Another kind of indeterministic hypothesis is the assertion of a physical indeterminacy (such as Heisenberg's interpretation of quantum mechanics) which underlies the apparent lawfulness found in scientific description. This indeterminacy enters into the causation of events, particularly submiscroscopic events, making it impossible to describe them completely in a lawful way.
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle has been reinterpreted by some physicists as being simply a statement of experimental error, which may be reduced by further advances in technique or by the creation of more complete explanatory hypotheses which describe “hidden” variables. Even if this kind of indeterminacy exists, it is extremely unlikely that it would be a factor in human behavior. There is abundant empirical evidence that the human organism embodies thousands of homeostatic mechanisms which counteract internal and external environmental fluctuations which are millions of times greater than the effects of Heisenberg indeterminacy. The effects of the death or spontaneous firing of neurons are hugely greater than such indeterminacy, yet neural nets are known to compute in ways that insure that such events do not alter the process or the result. Whether physical indeterminacy exists or not, the human organism is well protected against its effects.
Often an attempt is made to “prove” that indeterminacy exists (using logical arguments which therefore embody deterministic assumptions!). This could only be done by exclusion if all the laws of nature and their domains were perfectly known. In view of the foregoing discussion of the inherent incompleteness and inconsistency of scientific knowledge, it is evident how impossible such a task would be.
If we assume that an indeterministic hypothesis is true, what would the consequences be for human freedom? That would exempt at least some events from the strict determinism implied by scientific laws, and this exemption is often thought to provide a basis for human freedom, since a person's choices and decisions would not be completely subject to the lawfulness and predictability of scientific description. But since he would then be subject to apparently random causes forever beyond his ability to know or predict, he would be less free, not more! We do sometimes intervene in known determined events in order to bring about desired consequences, which at least gives us the freedom to actualize our desires (even if both our desires and our actions are also thought to be determined). But we are completely powerless even to actualize ourselves when faced with unpredictability, whether due to lack of knowledge about lawful events or due to inherently indeterminate chaos. There are many meanings to the word freedom, but indeterminism negates all of them. We may strike out blindly or wait passively, but we cannot act intelligently in response to unpredictable events, and we certainly do not feel free when faced with unknowable chaos.
Indeterminism also negates responsibility, since if one of my acts is indeterminate, then I cannot gain control over its causes, I cannot be responsible for its effects, and it would be equally absurd to suppose that any punishment or reeducation could have any corrective effect on future indeterminate acts. Responsibility and punishment are both based on the assumption that behavior is lawful and can be modified. Indeterminism replaces a reasonable tyrant which can be countered with its own weapons (knowledge and reason) with an unreasonable tyrant which can only be endured.
Since indeterminism destroys freedom in any sense of the word, it seems reasonable to question the widespread assumption that freedom is incompatible with determinism. In the discussion that follows, the assumption will be made that the hypothesis of universal strict determinism is true: that all events are completely lawfully determined, and therefore that the state of the universe at any time is uniquely determined by preceding events. As discussed earlier, whether or not this hypothesis is true is probably undecidable, but it may still be instructive to explore its implications for freedom.
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