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Dilts neurological levels, is another thing that Charles and I have been reexamining. As the book points out, Dilts levels do not consistently utilize criteria for either scope or category inclusion, and sometimes the hierarchical relationship is reversed. For instance, Dilts places identity at a higher (larger) level than beliefs. I think that he probably placed identity higher because it recursively describes itself, and this makes it much more powerful in influencing behavior. Curiously, this recursion actually bridges between logical levels (violating Russells Theory of Logical Types—more on this later).
However, since identity is composed of the beliefs that we have about ourselves, it is a smaller subset of the much more general term beliefs, so it should be at a lower (smaller) level in a hierarchy than beliefs.
The book also critiques Michael Halls Meta-States work, in which levels of experience also figure prominently. Like most others in the field, Hall misses the difference between scope and category that has been hidden for years in the experiences described by the words meta, chunk, frame, and outcome in the earlier NLP model. Since Hall places great value on the use of large categories, his approach is essentially a conscious mind, top-down, large-chunk, approach, often omitting FA, the unconscious, and the ecology of the larger system.
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